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Osamudia R. James
Diversity, Democracy and
White Racial Identity:
Schuette v. Coalition to
Defend Affirmative Action
Spring of 2014 will bring an opinion in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, the Supreme Court’s latest case implicating affirmative action
in higher education. When issued, it will follow the Court’s last pronouncement
on affirmative action, made in June 2013 in Fisher v. University of Texas. In that
opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed that an institution of higher education’s
consideration of race in the admissions process is subject to strict scrutiny when
under constitutional review.1 In doing so, the Court also implicitly reaffirmed
the diversity rationale, as articulated in Grutter v. Bollinger, which allows institutions of higher education to consider race in the admissions process when
necessary to admit a diverse entering class. For diversity advocates the Fisher
holding was a relief, if not a decisive victory, regarding affirmative action, as
Justices Scalia and Thomas made clear that the only reason they refrained from
striking down the diversity rationale was because they had not been explicitly
asked to do so.2 Schuette now presents yet another opportunity for the Court to
revisit the diversity rationale, and as such, the continuing viability of affirmative action in higher education is again in question.
The issues to be resolved in Schuette also present an opportunity to examine
perceptions of race and racial inequality in our democracy, and to consider
how the diversity rationale shapes those perceptions. Following the Supreme
Court’s decision in Grutter to affirm the diversity rationale, anti-affirmative
action activists mobilized in opposition. In Michigan, activists successfully
placed Proposal 2 onto Michigan’s 2006 statewide ballot, an initiative to amend
the Michigan Constitution to “prohibit all sex- and race-based preferences in
public education, public employment, and public contracting.”3 After a balloting process in which activists resorted to deceptive tactics,4 it ultimately
received enough votes to pass by a margin of 58 percent to 42 percent.5 Now
enshrined in the state’s constitution as Article 1, Section 26, Proposal 2 ensures that race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin cannot be considered
in admissions decisions within the State of Michigan, despite the fact that
consideration of the same is specifically permitted by Grutter.
_________________________
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Proposal 2 was eventually challenged by the Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality by Any
Means Necessary (BAMN), in conjunction with a group of concerned faculty
members and prospective and current students at the University of Michigan
(the Cantrell Plaintiffs). Writing for the Sixth Circuit, Judge Cole struck down
Proposal 2, explaining that it unconstitutionally “‘targets a program that inures
primarily to the benefit of the minority’ and reorders the political process in
Michigan in a way that places special burdens on racial minorities.”6 Advocates for other types of admissions criterion, he continued, including athletic
ability, geographic diversity, or family alumni status, have several options for
having the state adopt an admissions policy that considers that factor, including “lobbying the admissions committee, petitioning university leadership,
influencing the school’s governing board, or initiating a statewide campaign
to alter the state constitution.”7 “In contrast,” he further explained, “minority students seeking to adopt a constitutionally permissible race-conscious
admission policy can only do one thing: amend the Michigan constitution, a
process that is described as ‘lengthy, expensive, and arduous…’”8 Judge Cole
ultimately concluded that because Proposal 2 forces minorities to “surmount
procedural hurdles in reaching their objectives over which other groups do
not have to leap,” it thus presents an equal protection violation.9
Now on certiorari to the Supreme Court, the final decision in Schuette may
significantly impact the fate of race-conscious admissions policies in higher
education. Current arguments in support of Proposal 2, however, also reflect
problematic understandings of the nature of race and racism in the United
States—understandings that are formed, in part, by current deployments of
the diversity rationale itself.
The diversity rationale has a negative impact on white understanding of
race and racial inequality. Although deployed in support of a more racially
inclusive higher education sector, the rationale does not actually contribute
to progressive thinking about race and identity. Rather, it perpetuates an old
story about using black and brown bodies for white purposes, as institutions
of higher education often do when they admit students of color to capitalize
on the social and cultural capital that amasses to “diverse” institutions in the
United States. The University of Wisconsin, for example, photoshopped a
student of color into an admissions brochure to portray a more racially diverse
campus than it actually had. As scholars have thoughtfully noted, using students of color in this way commodifies racial identity, distancing individuals
from an integral aspect of their personhood.10 When diversity is pursued for
primarily aesthetic reasons, it is also often unaccompanied by initiatives to
genuinely improve the racial climate on campuses and surrounding communities. These weak commitments to diversity easily buckle under the pressure
of hard times; indeed, diversity initiatives are often the first to be jettisoned
in times of financial hardship.11
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The diversity rationale also reinforces the transparency of white racial
identity, while emphasizing innocent white identity, because it is untethered to
notions of social and racial justice, the nature of both individual and structural
discrimination, or consideration of the impact of white privilege in both the
admissions process and society more generally. Unaware of the privileges that
inure to being white, students cannot understand the racialized disadvantages
that often attach to being non-white. Whites begin, then, to perceive diversity
initiatives and affirmative action programs as a sort of “reverse discrimination,” where Whites are the innocent victims of programs and policies that
benefit undeserving non-Whites who didn’t “work as hard” as victimized
Whites. One need look no further than Abigail Fisher, the lead plaintiff in
Fisher v. University of Texas. Asked why she was challenging the University
of Texas’s use of race in its admission policies, she explained that the only
difference between her application and that of her minority peers that were
awarded admission was “the color of [their] skin,”12 and that in challenging
the policy, she “hop[ed] that [the Supreme Court would] take race out of the
issue in terms of admissions and that everyone will be able to get into any
school that they want no matter what race they are but solely based on their
merit and if they work hard for it.”13
Superficial deployments of the diversity rationale in higher education also
leave college students unprepared for democracy. As explained by Danielle
Allen, citizenship consists of “long-enduring habits of interaction [that] give
form to public space and so to our political life.”14 In a pluralistic society with
no shortage of racial inequalities, full citizenship cannot be realized unless
everyone is given an opportunity to form those social and political habits of
interaction. A commitment to equal citizenship, then, necessarily requires a
commitment to bringing everyone into the franchise, even as it requires recognition that privilege cannot be maintained for particular groups. For Whites,
this commitment can only develop when accompanied by an honest assessment
of white privilege, an understanding of how that privilege perpetuates racism
and differential societal status, and a willingness to release that privilege.
Current deployment of the diversity rationale, however, fails to encourage
those developments, resulting instead in white racial-identity performance
that is unaware that collective democratic action involves communal decisions that will “inevitably benefit some citizens at the expense of others, even
when the whole community generally benefits.”15 Affirmative action might be
considered one such decision, particularly because the “benefit” is actually a
correction for racial exclusion. Whites, however, are often unprepared to incur
any cost if the ultimate benefit inures to people of color—even if that benefit
is actually part of a just redistribution. This zero-sum view of dominance and
power underlies the problematic distribution of power, privilege, and political
representation by race and makes impossible the sort of inclusive democracy
for which we should strive.16
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Which brings us back, then, to Schuette. The very Michigan constitutional
amendment that prompted the case is an example of the problems with the
current deployment of the diversity rationale. Divorced from any conception of remediation or social justice, diversity is a palatable goal as long as
it remains non-threatening. When, however, Whites are asked to relinquish
some measure of privilege to bring others into the franchise, diversity is
quickly jettisoned; unanchored from moorings that fully articulate the need
for diversity, it becomes all too easy to assert that the pursuit of diversity is
not just inconvenient, but also reverse racism. In the context of the Schuette
case, Proposal 2, deceptively cloaked in language that purported to promote
equality, ultimately passed. Passing a ballot initiative to amend a state constitution sounds like a legitimate democratic exercise, but was actually the
use of a democratic process to further exclude minorities and other socially
marginalized groups from access to representation, participation and power.
In his Sixth Circuit opinion, Judge Cole admirably highlighted the democratic defect that Proposal 2 and the ensuing amendment to Michigan’s constitution reflect: Proposal 2 effectively makes it more difficult for minorities
to petition their government officials to properly account for structural disadvantage based on race or ethnicity. Proposal 2 does not, as Michigan Attorney
General Schuette argued in his Supreme Court brief, merely require equal
treatment of the laws.17 Rather, by endorsing a constitutional amendment that
requires absolute “race-neutrality,” structural disadvantage by race is ignored
as long as it is not reflected in official policy. As a result, state admissions
policies that do account for structural advantage by allowing admissions officers to consider race or ethnicity as one factor in decisions become the only
“discriminatory” policies that need to be dismantled.
The irony, of course, is that it is precisely a superficial deployment of diversity that has helped advance this inversion of equal protection jurisprudence.
Both ahistorical and acontextual, the diversity rationale ignores issues of
racial or social justice, and is silent on the privilege typically afforded Whites
in the public school system, from elementary school to higher education.
Such a view of race and discrimination in the United States has informed the
Supreme Court-sanctioned “colorblind” approach to equal protection, which
finds a potential equal protection violation whenever the state differentiates
between similarly situated groups.18 In the context of race, this has led to the
preservation of facially neutral laws that have a disparate impact on minority
groups, such as Proposal 2. These laws are upheld so long as no intentional
discriminatory purpose is found. At the same time, race-conscious government policies that are implemented with the specific intent to ameliorate racial
inequality are prohibited.19
To be clear, the goal of diversity is not the problem, as I support and endorse efforts to diversify institutions of higher education. Indeed, institutions
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that function as gatekeepers to valuable social and cultural capital are fundamentally illegitimate if that access is limited to the racially and economically
privileged. Rather, it is the ways in which Whites react to those goals, as
informed by the superficial deployment of the diversity rationale, that is the
problem. Although the diversity narrative is one of inclusion, by magnifying
the transparency phenomenon, the rationale encourages simplistic and unrealistic notions of merit, while discouraging recognition of white privilege.
It also perpetuates white identities grounded in racial innocence, such that
would-be plaintiffs are free to challenge even the diversity rationale, itself,
as unfair to Whites.
Unless remedied, the impact of the diversity rationale on white racial
identity and understanding of race has long-term negative consequences for
racial justice. We are, for example, potentially on the precipice of a Supreme
Court decision in Schuette that will provide a model for others opposed to
affirmative action to eliminate it through “democratic” processes. To prevent
this, institutional narratives about diversity and use of the diversity rationale
as justification for race-conscious measures must shift away from narratives
about the usefulness and benefits of diversity toward a narrative that also
address the illegitimacy of all-white institutions. Diversity is not just about
training students for a global marketplace, citizenship, or deepening intellectual
exchange—it is also about broadening access to social and cultural capital for
all, including poor people and people of color.
At colleges and universities, this means more than a blurb about diversity
in the glossy pages of admissions materials. Instead, institutions should initiate
broader campaigns committed to informing potential and current members
of university communities that their mission necessarily includes broadened
access for all. All schools may not necessarily adhere to such a mission, but
institutions that advocate a commitment to the diversity rationale in admissions purportedly do and so can be expected to deepen their commitment to
diversity in ways that positively impact white racial identity.
Relatedly, institutional commitments to individualized review must be
better contextualized for students. Admissions is an inherently individualized, subjective, and idiosyncratic process. That reality, however, should not
be used only to justify the consideration of race, but should also be used to
help students understand the multitude of factors that are considered in the
applications of each student. Individualized review may consider the athletic
background of some students, the legacy status of others, and the unique social
experiences of minority students—experiences that are informed by race, no
matter what the student’s ultimate worldview. Individualized review may also
consider the racial or ethnic background that privileges some students prior
to college. Other factors like class or disability may (or may not) mitigate or
compound marginalization or privilege on account of race and ethnicity, and
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admissions officers will often have to make hard decisions about how these
factors affect students, and whether the institution would be best served by
that student’s admission and enrollment. To this extent, individualized review
does not attempt to remedy societal discrimination, but it does take into account the social impact of race on all applicants—white and non-white—and
on the institutions themselves, and should be discussed as such. The goal is
not necessarily to make every rejected (or admitted) applicant perfectly happy
with an institution’s admissions decisions, but to help the Abigail Fishers of
the world accept those decisions by enabling them to understand the larger
societal context in which those decisions are made.
In the post-admissions context, a more substantive commitment to diversity
might look like mandatory classes for incoming students about the racialized
nature of opportunity and inequality in the United States.20 Given the aspects
of white identity most negatively impacted by superficial deployments of
diversity, such a course would explore white and non-white racial identity,
racial privilege, or narratives of meritocracy in the United States. This approach signals not just a commitment to improved racial climate, but a step
toward unpacking myths about merit while making white privilege more
visible, such that anti-racist white identity can develop. Lest such a mandate
seem unnecessary, consider the Minneapolis Community and Technical College, where a Professor of English and African Diaspora studies was formally
reprimanded under the College’s anti-discrimination policy for making white
students feel uncomfortable in her classroom discussions of structural racism
and white privilege.21
Ultimately changes like these can help mediate the flawed social and
political climate that led to Proposal 2 in the first place. In the meantime, we
must rely on the Supreme Court’s forthcoming opinion in Schuette to uphold
Judge Cole’s attempts to right the political defect that our current diversity
rationale has promoted. Given, however, the hints that several Justices dropped
in Fisher, you’ll forgive me if I am not holding my breath.
__________________________
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